Why do we expect sectarian leaders to accept negotiations?

Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, the people and sectarian leaders have been living an illusion. An illusion of a flourishing economy, of the inevitability of immigration, of the diaspora money that the banking system attracts, of the stable Lebanese pound exchange rate, of the stability of constitutional institutions, coexistence, civil peace, and, finally, but most important, of the indefectible power of these leaders.

The collapse of this illusion meant the end of the tools that the sectarian leaders used over the last 30 years, to bribe and control society. Indeed, the worse the situation gets, the greater the chances of defections, and the more steadily the fall of the existing power system. The sectarian leaders are incapable of dealing with this situation because as it is the opposite of the role they have played for years. It is left to those who take the responsibility today, to distribute losses while the regime had built their power by distributing the spoils.

Based on this reading of the situation, the leaders face intense internal and external pressure:

Internal pressures:

Any decision by leaders today, in the context of an intense crisis with a constant accumulation of losses, will harm the interests of one group and relatively safeguard the interests of another. This kind of decision, if taken by the leader of one sect, will cause him to lose the support of members of his own sect, even if he takes into account their interests, without gaining the support of members of another sect. Thus, the sectarian leaders are unable to manage the crisis because they are prisoners of their sectarian roles. The country’s dire financial and social situation is therefore putting pressure on them. While it is true that they are warlords, of the decision of starting a new war or risking the partition of the country, is not a decision they can take lightly. We must not forget that they have experienced war, and they know very well that preceding leaders were assassinated or lost family members. They are fully aware that any internal disturbances can cause them immediate personal danger. All they are doing today, because of this incapacity, is feeding disputes and accusing each other, which increases sectarian tensions and raises the level of unwanted security risks.

External pressure:

Some assume that any outside intervention in Lebanon aims to restore the system as it was, at a time when regional and international countries aim to either maintain a minimum level of stability, even at the expense of citizens’ basic standard of living, or to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip in their conflicts. In both cases, the sectarian leaders have no influence over what is decided abroad, although they are very concerned about what might come out of any agreement. They will therefore seek affiliations with whomever they can, in order to safeguard their power.

We, as a movement, deal with the outside world based on the fact that Lebanon is a State. Enmity is an exceptional case between states because of the serious consequences it engenders. Lebanon is in a state of war with the Zionist project because the latter is designed to undermine our society and the foundations of the Civil State. Lebanon’s relations with other countries should be based on different levels of convergence or divergence of interests. Therefore, in our communication with the different regional and international actors, we carefully take into consideration their interests while reiterating clearly our vision considering the needs of the Lebanese society, which is a form of negotiation in itself.

The quid pro quo that is being offered today to the sectarian leaders is very clear. Their first option is to take the risk of losing everything, by continuing to deny their inability, fuelling internal dissension and drawing in foreign interventions. Their second option is to negotiate the loss of some of the power and influence they have accumulated in order to ensure their survival in political life within a state that enjoys full civil legitimacy. This is only possible if they accept relinquishing power during a transitional period according to a well-defined project that may succeed or fail. Our role, of course, is to enhance the chances of success of this transitional period.