Early parliamentary elections will not provide the desired transition during this stage. Elections are based on distributing seats between majority and minority, but within the same system that we have been living under for decades. The focus of a real opposition must be on transitioning from this form of power to another – one based on a civil state that is potent and just. It is necessary to highlight that any form of elections reinforces the legitimacy of the political system and is only a way to modify those responsible within that system. Elections become meaningful when the legitimacy of the state is firmly established – when political parties make real choices in procedural sectoral, social, and economic policies, and voters react to these policies according to their self-interests. Elections under the current sectarian system, on the other hand, are fruitless because they are nothing more than measures of leaders’ popularity within a sect and across sects. As such, elections are void of any true public politics and are simply assemblies of identities and fear-mongering, as are the governments themselves (so called “national unity” governments). In fact, the authorities do not hold elections until they are certain of their outcome.

Participating in elections, however, can be justified when it is to publicly endorse a clear alternative political project developed by a specific, political alliance. Thus, elections would demonstrate the support for that clear project. This avenue, however, requires time to bear fruit, and in the face of the current crisis, we do not have the luxury of time. More importantly, this avenue calls for clarity in political discourse while the majority of those that claim to be part of the opposition are not yet ready for it, either because they shirk their responsibilities or because they have ambitions for certain political positions.

Our proposal pertaining to the separation between the nation inside and outside revolves around the government establishing serious relations with the outside as an outsider. Especially in a small country, the transition that the crisis imposes on those who want to overcome its effects and causes requires establishing steady economic relations with countries that are not hostile to us and do not seek to fragment our society and threaten the legitimacy of our authority. The economy is political by nature.

We are well aware that the Lebanese who are engaged in sectarian politics and especially sectarian leaders cannot envision a state that deals with the outside as an outsider in the same way that they cannot imagine that the inside is an actual society. Sectarian politics is essentially a rejection of societal reality and of the notion of state without which notions of outside and inside are meaningless.

The term “reforms” insinuates that there is a regime that was put in place to serve the general interest, that was able, at certain times, to prove its capability of achieving its purpose, thus demonstrating its success. Today, this regime is no longer capable of successfully performing its duty, which makes it unable to achieve the goals for which it was created.

Many have suggested reforming the regime to treat the causes that led to its failure, so that it can replicate former successes. But the truth is, that today’s regime of sectarian leaders’ coalition was never ever able, in any past experience, to secure the public’s interest, due to a structural and operational flaw in the way this system was built. It was never a people or mismanagement issue, but an issue with the system, that cannot operate otherwise. Therefore, any illusionary success, that some thought was achieved, was fake, and people settled with it to bring a 15-year civil war to an end, fearing it to resume. People were bribed with undue benefits and a luxury lifestyle.

That is exactly why we are not looking to reform the current system, because we deem it irreparable and unreformable. We should however cease the opportunity of this system’s collapse to change it for the better. Hence the necessity of a decisive contribution to an alternative which will impose a transfer of power that will build a just, democratic and civil state capable of protecting the entire society by securing public interest.

In brief, effective reform does not lie in changing the players or patching gaps, but rather in a fundamental change of the rules of the game touching the very structure of the system.

The sectarian taïfas leaders are neither absolutely evil nor are they angels, they are just prisoners of their roles especially within their sub-group, who are citizens who consider their relationship with the state should be mediated by the sectarian taïfa group. These leaders depend on vertically divided entities that include in their ranks all segments of society, with contradictory interests.  Therefore, it is impossible for any leader, regardless of his career and his professional and political experience, to take any public interest decision, any decision that may cause a rift within his sectarian taïfa between the beneficiary of the decision and those penalized. From here, we see that the leader is seeking two goals: 1) satisfying all segments of his sectarian taïfa, thus avoiding taking any decision, in addition to 2) establishing a sense of reassurance for them, i.e. spreading a firm feeling that he is able to defend their interests from the other side and getting them as much available resources as possible.

During the civil war, sectarian taïfas parties established a system of quotas whereby each party that controlled a separate geographical area took over parts of state institutions. This privilege, considered as a spoil of war, became a symbol for the sectarian taïfa leaders, founding their societal relationships. Retaining those spoils became a priority for them in their decision making process.

In the exceptional situation we live in, where the viability conditions of the existing system have vanished, it becomes impossible for involved leaders to make decisions related to the disaster because it requires them to make cross-sectarian choices. Any decision they make will harm the interests of one social group in favor of another. They cannot afford conflicts with part of their sectarian taïfa that would jeopardize the structure of relationships inherited from the war and they will not get additional support from the favored group in the other sectarian taïfas.